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Abstract. The core of the article can be comprised in the question: Will population ageing become a 
threat to our standard of living? Because the demographic and the economic system -  linked together 
in this question -  share significant determinants,  the future state of both systems has been derived 
from the  same mother  scenarios.  In order to  explore a  broad  range of possibilities two  strongly 
contrasting mother scenarios serve as the starting-points  of the analyses.  The economic-demographic 
relationship is mediated through a simple Cobb-Douglas production function. The question of whether 
the ageing process will jeopardize the standard  of living, is, for each of the demographic projections, 
answered by comparing them with three economic targets, formulated in terrns of GNP per capita growth 
and  capital  stock growth.  The most  important  conclusion  is  that  in  the  long tun  neither  of the 
scenarios developed will generate an economic growth comparable with that of the 1960s  and  1970s. 
Nelissen, J. H. M., et Vossen A. P.,  1993.  L'effet de la croissance de la population sur le niveau de 
vie. Divers scénarios démo-économiques pour les Pays-Bas.  European Journal of Population/Revue 
Européenne de Démographie, 9:  169-196. 
Résumé.  L'essentiel de cet article cherche ä répondre ä la question suivante:  le vieillissement de la 
population risque-t-il d'être ä l'avenir une menace pour notre niveau de vie? Du fait que les systèmes 
tant économique que démographique -  intimement liés dans cette question -  ont des causes communes 
importantes,  l'état ä venir des deux systèmes a été déduit de scénarios communs. En vue d'explorer 
un  large éventail  de possibilités  le point de  départ  de  nos  analyses  est  basé  sur  deux  scénarios 
fortement opposés. La relation entre économie et démographie est posée ä l'aide d'une simple fonction 
de production du type Cobb-Douglas. Nous répondons  ä la question initiale posée pour chacune des 
projections démographiques en comparant trois objectifs économiques, formulés en termes de croissance 
du PNB par habitant et d'accumulation du capital. La conclusion la plus importante est que dans le 
long terme  aucun  divers  scénarios  ne génère  une croissance économique comparable  ä  celle des 
décennies  1960  ä  1970. 
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1.  Introduction 
The aim of this article is to elaborate  on the question of whether popula- 
tion ageing will become a serious threat to the standard of living. The issue 
is  placed  within  the  broader  field  of  population  studies  in  which  the 
relationship between population  development  and economic  growth  has 
always  been  debated.  Although  there  is  a  lot  of  empirical  evidence 
convincingly showing a significant relationship, the question about the exact 
causal  character,  embodied  in  a  comprehensive  theory,  has  never  been 
answered satisfactorily (Simon, 1989). Most studies in this field are restricted 
to selected aspects of the relationship and merely analyse the impact of future 
demographic  development on,  for example,  social security costs,  labour 
supply or consumption. 1  Moreover, these studies deal with only one (official) 
demographic standard projection, without explicitly wondering whether the 
basic  assumptions  underlying  this  projection  are  consistent  with  their 
economic assumption  s. Besides, the fact is often neglected that the variability 
of the population system can be very substantial, especially in the long run. 
In this article we  will pay special attention to precisely these points  by 
adopting a more integrated approach.  This approach will enable us to see 
which specific demographic  scenarios might or might not jeopardize  the 
future standard of living, the latter being operationalised in terms of the gross 
national product per capita (GNP). 
Our analysis is based on a rather direct approach,  see Carlsson (1990). 
An alternative can be found in the attempts by economists to incorporate 
demographic projections into general equilibrium models.  With respect to 
the ageing of the population, see for instance Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hagemann 
and Nicoletti (1989),  Masson and Tryon (1990) and Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner 
and Summers  (1990).  This general equilibrium approach makes it possible 
to look at the effect of ageing on the optimal timing of tax collections, interest 
rates  and the implications of integrated world capital markets.  We opted 
for another approach because the results from such a general equilibrium 
approach only refer to the steady-state situation. We, do however, focus on 
the question of which growth paths are feasible and if not, when will these 
problems  arise,  so that the steady-state situation generally is not relevant 
to us.  Because our emphasis is also not on distributional (such as intergen- 
1  See for The Netherlands in this respect e.g. Goudriaan et al.  (1984), Nelissen and Vossen (1985), 
contributions in Koninklijke Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde (1987),  Nieuwenhuis (1989), 
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erational) issues and the possible effect via international capital markets, 
the general equilibrium approach is not necessarily appropriate here.  2 
To answer our previous question -  whether population ageing threatens 
our  standard  of  living  -  we  use  strongly  diverging  scenarios  for  the 
population system. These scenarios serve as a starting-point for the economic 
calculations. The demographic and economic system will be connected by 
(different) series of labour force participation. The analyses have been carried 
out for The Netherlands. Since the demographic, economic and political 
structure of The Netherlands can more or less be considered representative 
for most of the modern populations, the results can grosso  modo be gener- 
alised. 
In Section 2 a three-level scenario system will be presented, followed in 
Section 3  by the projection results.  The next section gives the resulting 
standard of living, considering three possible economic growth scenarios. 
Finally, Section 5 reviews and concludes. 
2.  An outline of the scenarios 
We start this section by making some general remarks on the limited scope 
and  function  of  our  analysis.  Apart  from  the  absence  of  a  valid  and 
specified theory integrating the demographic and  economic system, our 
choice for the remote future as time dimension may give additional grounds 
for scepticism about the credibility of the following analyses. As fax as the 
demographic system is concerned, Ryder recently expressed the ambiguity 
inherent to population  forecasting  as  follows:  "One  of the most useful 
products social science has to offer is the population forecast... It remains 
an old-fashioned art form, somewhat embarrassing to the profession, like a 
disreputable relative" (Ryder,  1990: 433).  It is obvious that the same kind 
of feelings live, may be even stronger, among economists. One should bear 
in mind, however, that the opinions stated here regard the purely predic- 
tive power of both disciplines. It is our conviction that looking into the future 
can be useful even when it has little or even no predictive potential at all. 
As a matter of fact it can be very fruitful to confront policy makers with 
uncertainty instead of certainty. The kind of future study which supplies 
2 Here, it is  implicitly assumed  that  changes  in international  capital flows are absent.  Of course, 
changes in these flows affect the results (Cutler, et al., 1990:  37),  but the effect heavily depends upon 
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consistent and coherent patterns of uncertainty is generally called a scenario 
approach.  According to Willekens "Its goal is not to predict the future,  but 
to provide the user with alternative internally consistent futures against which 
decisions can be tested and actions planned." (Willekens, 1990: 12). In terms 
of a typology suggested by Romaniuc the type of projection that will be 
presented here could best be described as a 'prospective analysis'. Romaniuc 
characterizes  the concept as follows: "The hallmarks of this type of projection 
are  'potentiality' rather than  'inevitability', and  'plausibility' rather than 
'certainty' or 'probability'." (Romaniuc, 1990: 23). 
The resulting demo-economic  long term perspectives are based on a three- 
level scenario system. To begin with, the situation for the year 2015  will 
be pictured for each of the three levels, with differing levels of specifica- 
tion.  Unless  explicitly stated,  the  relevant  systems  are  assumed  to  be 
relatively stable beyond this anchor year. In general, the trajectory between 
the point of departure, 1990, and the year 2015 will be generated by simple 
interpolation procedures. 
The  first  level (a)  contains  assumptions about  the main elements of 
the  'mother' scenario, viz. general socio-cultural characteristics, general 
characteristics of the economic system, general characteristics of the state 
of technological development and finally general characteristics of govern- 
mental policy. On the second level (b)  these general characteristics are 
specified and transposed in terms of elements of the relevant  'context' 
scenarios, describing the state of systems which are supposed to contain direct 
determinants of both demographic and economic development. As such we 
distinguish the primary relations/demographic reproduction system, the 
bio-medical system, the international mobility system and the labour supply 
system. On the third level (c) the expected trends derived from level bare 
quantified into model parameters in such a way that calculations can be made, 
enabling us to answer the question of what standard of living consequences 
might be expected from foreseen demographic and economic developments. 
Two key scenarios will be elaborated in more detail, whereas another 
couple of scenarios will be described only generally. Both these key scenarios 
can be considered as specific, fairly consistent and coherent combinations 
of the structural elements as distinguished above. However, given the absence 
of theoretical knowledge providing firm causal relations between a-  and 
b- respectively b- and c-level variables, choices between equally plausible 
options were occasionally inevitable. Decisions in this respect were made 
in such a way that the resulting scenarios might be considered as strongly 
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able.  This  does not imply that other combinations are less imaginable or 
less plausible than the ones worked out in the following. Once again, what 
we are trying to evoke is a range of uncertainties that are inherent in looking 
into a distant future. 
Towards a  'hyper dynamic' society:  HD 
The first scenario is based on the general assumption that recent trends will 
continue in a highly progressive, accelerating way, thus resulting in a strongly 
individualized society, which is oriented towards material values, prosperous, 
and highly dynamic. In the following, this scenario will be labeled HD for 
short.  Transposed  into the main elements of the mother scenario we can 
sketch the following picture of the situation in the year 2015. 
*  In the socio-cultural  sphere, society can be characterized as being strongly 
secularized  and  individualized.  Human  action,  on  different levels,  is 
predominantly based upon the rational choice principle. People are,  on 
the whole ego-oriented, or in Durkheim's terms, very Gesellschaft oriented. 
As  a  consequence, the social structure is highly atomized. There is  an 
undeniable  emphasis  on  production  and  consumption  in  a  strongly 
competitive, hedonistic climate. 
*  The economy operates successfully within a highly industrialized and auto- 
mated production system, which is oriented towards international markets 
and which, due to a lack of raw materials, emphasises the tertiary sector. 
*  A  substantial  part of the economic growth is invested in a technology 
directed towards material goals, based on permanent education and leading 
to highly sophisticated remunerative production systems. 
*  Responding  to  socio-cultural,  economic  and  technological  trends, 
government policy  is  characterized by  a  'laissez  faire'  attitude.  As  a 
consequence the concept of the welfare state is strongly eroded, and goods 
and services of the former public sector have been taken over by the private 
market sector. As a result there will be a sharp contrast in welfare between 
subsections within society, the proportion of 'haves' however being con- 
siderably larger than the proportion of 'have-nots'. 
The situation described above ('a'  level) could lead to the following states 
of the relevant sectors ('b'  level). 
*  In the sphere of primary relations  and demographic  reproduction,  the 
institution of traditional marriage will be abolished and replaced by part- 
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and rationalized choice of partners, where there is strong competition with 
the attainment of material goals. Due to high separation levels a  large 
number  of people  live  alone.  And,  since  many  women  strive  for  a 
professional career, opportunity costs are high, so fertility will be far below 
replacement level. 
*  Bio-medical  development  is favoured by general technological progress. 
Due to a positive correlation between welfare and life expectancy, the latter 
is  increasing considerably, and high quality  (privatized) health provi- 
sions enable people to be active in the economy up to higher ages. Birth 
control  has  been  perfected:  unwanted  pregnancies  and  involuntary 
childlessness are rare. 
*  Being a relatively small country with only a limited domestic market, there 
is a strong international orientation aiming at a profitable export of high 
quality  commodities  and  human  capital.  Consequently  international 
geographic  mobility  will be intensive. As far as permanent settlement is 
concerned there will be a continuous demand for low-skilled labourers 
from less developed countries. 
*  Labour participation  rates  will be high for  both males  and  females. 
Retirement takes place at high ages,  thus permitting people to realize 
their material aspirations.  To meet high quality standards a long basic 
education period as weil as permanent education are obligatory. Unpaid, 
voluntary jobs will be exceptional since work, including social work, 
has been high professionalized. 
Towards an  ideational  system oriented towards non-material  values:  IV 
The second key scenario is based on the core assumption that, as a reaction 
to current trends dominantly stressing material goals, there will be a general 
orientation towards a more immaterial meaningful ideational system. This 
scenario will be abbreviated to IV (Immaterial Values oriented). Analogous 
to the description of HD,  we will first present the main elements of the 
'mother' scenario here. 
*  In the socio-cultural  sphere  there is  a deeply rooted consciousness of 
emancipation in the broadest sense, and a strong responsibility for the 
socially weak, on both the national and the international level. In short, 
people are  Gemeinschaft  oriented. Competition is replaced by  caring. 
The social structure is thus molecularized instead of atomized. Ideology 
is dominated by non-material goals. There is a  strong orientation to the 
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*  The economic system reflects values and goals as described above. Work 
is divided fairly over sexes and ethnic groups.  Industrialization respects 
nature and is ecologically friendly. Less developed countries are supported 
directly as weil as indirectly. 
*  Technological  development  is  certainly not neglected. But  contrary to 
the HD  scenario, the focus is now on non-material goals,  such as  the 
protection of the environment and the support of less developed coun- 
tries. 
*  Government policy plays an important role in a fair distribution of welfare 
over different categories of the population. There is a weil organized public 
sector with an emphasis on social justice. Against the background of a 
modest economic productivity, people  are  stimulated to  contribute  to 
unpaid social work on a voluntary basis. 
Translating these trends, the following situation can be envisaged. 
*  In the sphere of primary  relations  martial unions will be more stable, 
due among others to an equal role division between partners  inside and 
outside  the  family.  The  male  partner  takes  over  a  fair  share  of  the 
traditional  family  activities,  enabling  the  female  partner  to  realize 
aspirations outside the direct family sphere. A  substantial amount of time 
is  spent on childcare as well as  on care for the aged. In short,  family 
commitments are strengthened. With regard tofertility there will no longer 
be  constraints  on  the realization  of the  desired number of about  two 
children. 
*  Life expectancy  will increase,  although in a  less progressive way than 
was  assumed  in  HD,  because  of fewer  investments  in  technological 
development. Increase in longevity results  from  a  healthier and more 
relaxed lifestyle. 
*  The attitude towards both developing countries  (the economic support 
of people  in  their  own  country)  and  nature  (protecting  environment 
by  avoiding overpopulation),  will lead to  only  a  modest immigration 
surplus. 
*  The two main characteristics of labourforce participation are: an almost 
equal  sharing  of paid jobs  by males and females, predominantly on  a 
part time basis, and a considerable amount of unpaid working hours, which 
are likewise proportionally divided over both sexes. 
So much for the description of the pattern  and consequences of the two 
key scenarios. We shall now briefly introduce two other scenarios, which 
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Trend:  continuation of current trends 
In the first place we will include in our analysis a recent official popula- 
tion  forecast  produced by  the Netherlands  Central  Bureau  of Statistics 
(NCBS,  1990).  This population forecast can be regarded as a high-quality 
representative of the classical cohort component approach,  with its extra- 
polation of analytically refined historical demographic trends into the future. 
Every year it is accurately monitored and, if necessary, adjusted. It produces 
projections specifying population according to age, sex and civil status for 
the period of 1990-2050.  Demographic parameters  are extrapolated until 
2010 and the values are kept constant for the remaining period. 
Labour market participation rates  are extrapolated, resulting in a  slight- 
ly  diminishing male  participation  and  an  almost  doubled  female  par- 
ticipation. 3 For obvious reasons this projection will be named the Trend 
scenario. 
Zero population growth: ZPG 
Reaching a stationary or zero growth population has long been considered 
as  a  panacea for a  wide range of societal problems,  and under strongly 
varying conditions; see Höhn (1987) and Lesthaeghe (1989). When restricting 
to developed countries, some decades ago, an average of 2.1 children (being 
the completed family size in a  stationary population with low mortality) 
was viewed as a prerequisite to prevent overpopulation. Nowadays, the same, 
but according to actual levels relatively high, average number of children 
is considered to be an adequate weapon against the threat of underpopula- 
tion and ageing. Whether or not an equilibrium state of the population system 
can contribute in sõlving some of the problems that go hand in hand with 
demographic ageing, can be checked by comparing the results of the ZPG 
and the Trend scenario. 
It is assumed that the demographic zero growth parameters will be reached 
in the year 2000 and will stay constant afterwards. In order to evaluate the 
'net' benefits of a stationary population, the labour market participation rates 
of Trend, as briefly characterized above, will be applied in this projection 
variant too. The resulting scenario will be called the ZPG scenario. 
A further specification of the parameter values (level c) of the scenarios 
3 Since existing projections of labour market participation rates for The Netherlands are rather diver- 
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described above can be found in Table  1,  which also  contains  currently 
observed values. 
Both fertility parameters (total fertility rate and the standardized average 
age at which women have their children) beyond the anchor year 2015  are 
held constant  at the 2015  level. The trajectories between  1990  and 2015 
(between  1990  and 2000  for ZPG)  are simply calculated by interpolation, 
with the exception of Trend, however. In this  scenario (being the official 
Dutch forecast) the course of fertility is based on longitudinally estimated 
parity progression rates.  As far as mortality is concerned, life expectancy 
for the period 2015-2060  is based on the continuation of the trend assumed 
between 1990-2015,  except for Trend and ZPG. In the latter scenarios the 
2015  level is held constant.  In all scenarios external migration surpluses 
are fixed after 2015. The 1990-2015 trajectories are calculated again by inter- 
polation. 
Labour force participation is expressed on the aggregate level in net person 
years, thus indicating the average net number of years during which men and 
women are active in paid jobs. The ultimate 'labour force participation age 
profiles'  for the year 2015,  derived from these quantities, can be found in 
Fig.  1. 
It will be  clear that the  step  from the b-level to  the  c-level is  a  very 
crucial  orte.  In  the  present  case  it  has  been  carried  out  by  the  authors 
themselves, one being an economist and the other a demographer. In fact this 
procedure, which includes the transposition  of the a-level to the b-level, 
Table  1.  Parameter values 2015. 
Fertility  Mortality  External  Labour force 
migration  participation 
Scenario  TRF  Mean  Life expect. Life expect. Migration  pers. years  pers. years 
matern, age  males  females  surplus  males  females 
HD  1.25  31.0  77.0  83.5  50,000  39.0  33.0 
IV  2.00  28.0  75.4  82.1  5,000  24.0  20.0 
Trend  1.65  30.0  75.0  81.5  25,000  31.5  26.5 
(2010)  (2010) 
ZPG  2.1  30.0  75.0  81.5  0  31.5  26.5 
(2010)  (2010) 
1990 Values 
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Fig.  1.  Labour force participation age profiles. 
should  be  a  more  formalized  one.  An  appropriate  way  to proceed  in  this 
case  is  a  Delphi  approach  in  which  a  multidisciplinary  team  of experts 
tries  to reach  consensus  in  an  'iterative'  process  of negotiating;  see Vossen 
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3.  Projection results 
Projections based on the scenarios stated above were carried out with the 
computer program INDEMPRO.  Its results will be described briefly from 
graphical  illustrations  presenting  consecutively population  total,  mean 
population age, the age structure,  and finally the 'labour years/population 
total' ratio. 
Population  total 
Figure 2  shows the development of population totals in the four scenarios 
for the period 1960-2060. The current number of inhabitants is a little over 
15  million (4.3%  aliens), i.e.  a population density of 439 inhabitants per 
square kilometre, which makes The Netherlands one of the most densely 
national populations; see NCBS  (1991). Due to the momentum of the age 
structure, population will continue to grow in the first coming three decades. 
In this period the momentum even overrules the subreplacement fertility 
levels in the  scenarios  HD  and  Trend.  After  the numerous  baby  boom 
generations have become extinct, two different trajectories gradually emerge, 
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The former couple will, in the long run,  show a rather stable population 
total (16 million), whereas the latter couple will show a constant decline. 
Age structure 
Mean population age (Fig. 3), being a first gross indicator of the population's 
age structure, is differing widely. Its ranking order is grosso modo the inverse 
of the population total order. All scenarios show a substantive rise, headed 
by HD which yields a 35% increase at the end. Both IV and Trend show a 
rather similar pattern. Its courses flatten or even go downwards around the 
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Fig.  3.  Mean age 1960-2060. 
A  more differentiated picture of the age patterns  can be obtained from 
Fig. 4, presenting the scenarios'  age structure for 2015  and 2060 respec- 
tively. 
For the year 2015  all scenarios feature the shifting of the birth plateau 
cohorts, through the age structure, who are at that time between 50 and 70 
years old. At the end of the projection period, because parameter values have DEMO-ECONOMIC  SCENARIOS FOR THE NETHERLANDS 
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Fig. 4.  Age structure. 
remained  constant,  all  scenarios  are  in  a  late phase  of stabilization.  It is 
clear that migration levels as such hardly influence the relatively  stable age 
composition, which can be explained by the fact that at both migration surplus 
levels  similar (actual)  age patterns  are  applied. 
Labour years 
The key variable connecting the demographic with the economic  system in 
our analysis is the annual volume of net labour years, which can be regarded 
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as  a  function of the population total,  its  demographic structure,  and age 
and sex specific labour force participation rates. 
Fig.  5  sketches the pattern of labour years  (expressed in index figures) 
for the different scenarios. In the HD scenario especially the sharp increase 
in  participation  rates  causes  neärly  55%  growth  in  labour-years  in  the 
1990-2020 period. Afterwards, a combination of stabilized participation rates, 
decreasing population  totals  and  the  changing age  structure,  leads  to  a 
substantial fall. In the IV variant the future course of labour years is more 
regular.  Participation  rates  are  rather  low,  and  in  spite  of  favourable 
demographic conditions, the labour-years output goes steadily downwards 
until 2040,  when it more or less stabilizes. The labour-years trajectory of 
both  'conservative' scenarios Trend and ZPG are very much alike and are 
something between the borderline scenarios HD and IV. Since labour force 
participation rates in Trend and ZPG are similar, the (only minor) differ- 
ence in labour years is caused by differences in demographic parameters. 
Although at first sight the underlying demographic regimes seem to be very 
distinct (see Table 1) the compensating effects of fertility and migration result 
in almost equal labour-years trajectories. 
Since the influence of total population numbers in this respect is obvious, 





oo,ii '  .........  ............ 
'90  2000  '10  '20  '30  '40  '50  '60 
period 
HD  +  IV  +  Trend  -~-  ZPG 
Fig.  5.  Labour years. DEMO-ECONOMIC SCENARIOS  FOR THE NETHERLANDS  183 
illustrative. That is why, in addition, the quantity LabYears/PopTot Ratio will 
be introduced here. Fig. 6 presents the results,  showing a picture which is 
not very different from Fig. 5. In 1990 1 out of 3 people (in terms of person 
years  equivalents) is  economically active.  In the IV scenario this  index 
gradually decreases to about 1 out of 4 in 2040, followed by somewhat higher 
constant levels afterwards (due to the expiration of the birth plateau cohorts). 
The HD  scenario, embodying a  strong sense of labour force participation, 
produces a strong growth in the LabYears/PopTot Ratio until 2015. By that 
time 1 out of 2 people contribute to the GNP.  After this year labour force 
participation rates are fixed, and the ageing population structure means that 
many elderly people leave the labour market, whereas at the same time 
cohorts of decreasing size take over their places. This structural effect pushes 
the ratio significantly downwards until 2040  (the expiration of the birth 
plateau cohorts), followed by a trend towards an ultimate constant level of 
just over 0.40. Trend and ZPG once again show a strong similarity in their 
courses. Changes in the first three decades are hardly significant. Later on 
the trend goes down slightly and starts to oscillate around an average value 
of about 0.33.  Although differences are  small, in all instances the trajec- 
tory Trend shows more favourable ratio values. From this it can be tentatively 
ratio 
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concluded that arguments in favour of ZPG population, arising from fears 
that ageing (as foreseen in Trend) will threaten economic welfare, are not 
weil founded. 
4.  The  effect  on the  standard  of living 4 
To  get an  impression of the growth capacity  under the different demo- 
graphic scenarios, we distinguish three economic targets, formulated here 
in terms  of questions. We investigate whether the concerning economic 
targets can be reached. For that goal we look at the GNP, the capital stock 
requirements, the investment ratio, the capital-labour ratio and the produc- 
tivity. The three questions are: 
*  What requirements with reference to the capital stock, the investment ratio, 
the productivity of labour and the capital-labour ratio are needed to keep 
the economic growth at the average level of the last 25 years  (in terms 
of real GNP per capita about 2.3% a year)? 
*  What are the implications for the indicators mentioned above when opting 
for zero economic growth (the real GNP per capita remaining constant 
at the 1990 level)? 
*  What will the development be in the real GNP per capita if we assume 
that the capital stock grows at the average rate observed during the period 
1980-1989  (about 3% a year)? 
The three economic objectives will be indicated by  GNP2.3,  GNP0  and 
CAP3, respectively. To answer these questions we need a production function 
with at  least labour and  capital  as  inputs.  5 We chose the Cobb-Douglas 
production function,  6 which was estimated for The Netherlands using data 
for the private sector for the period 1970-1989. The data have been derived 
from Central Planning Agency (several years). The estimation result for 
the (natural)  logarithm specification -  assuming an annual technological 
improvement of 0.5%  7 -  is stated in the following equation. 
4 The choice of the subject and of the description heavily draws on Carlson (1990). 
» If we had not been interested in capital needs, the approach of, for example, Okun (1970:  132-145) 
and McNees (1991) could have been chosen. See also Rasche and Tatom (1977). 
6 This type of production function is generally applied in this kind of applications; see e.g. Carlsson 
(1990), Cutler, et. al. (1990) and Auerbach, et al. (1989). 
7 This seems to be a reasonable percentage for the Netherlands. One could object that the technical 
progress depends -  among other things -  on the capital formation. However, literature is unambiguous 
to this point; see e.g. Simon (1981), Wattenberg (1987), Habakkuk (1962), Romer (1990) and Cutler 
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log  (Y/K)  -  0.5  t =  -4.241  -  0.036  log(L24/K) 
(-5.15)  (-0.42) 
+  0.372  log(L49/K)  +  0.309  log(L64/K) 
(1.41)  (2.50) 
mean (log(Y/K)  -  0.5  t) =  -8.34  R 2 =  0.986  S.E.  =  0.018 
with  Y  =  GNP in  1980  Dutch guilders 
L24  =  civilian employment persons <  25  years old 
L49  =  civilian employment persons  25-49  years old 
L64  =  civilian employment persons >  49 years old 
K  =  fixed capital  stock in  1980  Dutch guilders 
t  =  time trend 
The development in the real GNP per capita under the various targets  and 
its historical development from 1950  on is presented in Fig.  7. 
In the long run,  target GNP2.3  and target GNP0  can be considered as 
extreme.  Under the target CAP3,  HD,  Trend  and ZPG  have roughly the 
same development as target GNP2.3  until  2030.  The real GNP per capita 
index (1990=100; Iogarithm  scale) 
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is under HD even somewhat larger than the result for target GNP2.3 between 
1990 and 2020.  In 2060 GNP per capita is about four times the 1989-1evel 
under target GNP2.3.  Target  CAP3-HD lies almost exactly between target 
GNP2.3  and GNP0  (an average increase in the GNP per capita of about 
1.25%). In the long run the development in CAP3-Trend is consistent with 
the  developments during  the  years  1970-1989.  The  results  under  the 
economic target CAP3 diverge as the combined consequence of the differ- 
ences in the development  of the total population (see Fig. 2), the distribution 
between the three age groups (under 25,  25-49 and 50 and over) and the 
average number of labour years (see Fig. 5).  The population totals do not 
differ much. Labour years and the distribution between the three age groups, 
however, differ greatly and the development  in the GNP per capita obviously 
is the reaction to the course in the latter ones. 
The consequences for the capital stock requirement for the whole period 
are given in Table 2 (HD), Table 3 (IV), Table 4 (Trend) and Table 5 (ZPG), 
and are pictured -  also for the intervening years -  in Fig.  8.  Owing to the 
underlying assumption, target CAP3  shows a rise in the capital stock if the 
growth figures for the period 1980-1989 are maintained at 3% per year. 
The average capital stock growth under target (GNP2.3-HD,  GNP2.3-ZPG 
Table 2.  Decomposition of per capita GNP growth: HD (1990-2060) 
Target  GNP2.3  GNP0  CAP3 
Real GNP growth  2.311  -0.023  1.756 
= Technical progress  0.500  0,500  0.500 
+  Employment contr,  0.422  0.422  0.422 
+  Capital st. contr.  1.389  -0.945  1,065 
(= cap. st. growth  4.996  -3.399  3.000 
* elasticity)  0.355  0.355  0.355 
-  Employment growth  -0.243  -0,243  -0.243 
+ Change in employment-population ratio  0.266  0.266  0.266 
(= employment growth  0.243  0.243  0,243 
-  population gr.)  0,023  0.023  0.023 
= per capita GNP growth  2.334  0  1.779 
+ Population growth  -0.023  -0,023  -0,023 
= Real GNP growth  2.311  -0.023  1.756 
-  employment growth  -0.243  -0.243  -0.243 
=  Labour prod. growth  2.068  -0.266  1.513 DEMO-ECONOMIC  SCENARIOS  FOR THE NETHERLANDS 
Table 3.  Decomposition of per capita GNP growth: IV (1990-2060) 
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Target  GNP2.3  GNP0  CAP3 
Real GNP growth  2.424  0.090  1.275 
=  Technical progress  0.500  0.500  0.500 
+ Ernployment contr.  -0.059  -0.059  -0.059 
+  Capital st. contr.  1.983  -0.351  1.065 
(= cap. st. growth  7.133  -1.263  3.000 
* elasticity)  0.355  0.355  0.355 
-  Employment growth  0.319  0.319  0.319 
+ Change in employment-population ratio  -0.409  -0.409  -0.409 
(= employment growth  -0.319  -0.319  -0.319 
-  population gr.)  -0.090  -0.090  -0.090 
= per capita GNP growth  2.334  0  1.185 
+  Population growth  0.090  0.090  0.090 
=  Real GNP growth  2.424  0.090  1.275 
-  employment growth  0.319  0.319  0.319 
=  Labour prod. growth  2.743  0.409  1.594 
Table 4.  Decomposition of per capita GNP growth: Trend (1990-2050) 
Target  GNP2.3  GNP0  CAP3 
Real GNP growth  2.382  0.048  1.964 
=  Technical progress  0.500  0.500  0.500 
+ Employment contr.  0.399  0.399  0.399 
+  Capital st. contr.  1.483  -0.851  1.065 
(= cap. st. growth  4.177  -2.397  3.000 
* elasticity)  0.355  0.355  0.355 
-  Employment growth  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017 
+ Change in employment-population ratio  -0.031  -0.031  -0.031 
(= employment growth  0.017  0.017  0.017 
-  population gr.)  -0.048  -0.048  -0.048 
-- per capita GNP growth  2.334  0  1.916 
+ Population growth  0.048  0.048  0.048 
= Real GNP growth  2.382  0.048  1.964 
-  employment growth  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017 
= Labour prod. growth  2.365  0.031  1.947 188  JAN H.M. NELISSEN AND AD P. VOSSEN 
Table 5.  Decomposition of per capita GNP growth: ZPG (1990-2060) 
Target  GNP2.3  GNP0  CAP3 
Real GNP growth  2.418  0.084  1.911 
=  Technical progress  0.500  0.500  0.500 
+ Employment contr.  0.346  0.346  0.346 
+  Capital st. contr.  1.572  -0.762  1.065 
(= cap. st. growth  4.428  -2.146  3.000 
* elasticity)  0.355  0.355  0.355 
-  Employment growth  0.031  0.031  0.031 
+ Change in employment-population ratio  -0.053  -0.053  -0.053 
(= employment growth  0.031  0.031  0.031 
-  population gr.)  -0.084  -0.084  -0.084 
= per capita GNP growth  2.334  0  1.879 
+ Population growth  0.084  0.084  0.084 
=  Real GNP growth  2.418  0.084  1.963 
-  employment growth  -0.031  -0.031  -0.031 
= Labour prod. growth  2.387  0.053  1.932 
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and GNP2.3-Trend comes closest to the average development during the 
period  1950-1989,  i.e.  a  steady  and  sharp  increase.  In 2060  the capital 
stock will be about twenty-five times that of the 1990-1evel (GNP2.3-HD). 
The other variant under target GNP2.3  (GNP2.3-NV)  shows an even larger 
increase. 
Under target GNP0 the capital stock need almost continually decreases. 
Its rate depends on the population size and the percentage of workers. All 
three demographic targets  show a  comparable rate of decrease in the long 
run. GNP0-NV  stabilizes  during a period of fifty years  at the  1995-1evel. 
Since scenario NV generates some population growth, with a relatively low 
proportion of workers, a  somewhat larger capital stock is  needed, e.g. in 
comparison with GNP0-Trend. The opposite holds for GNP0-HD and GNP0- 
ZPG.  In 2050  the capital  stock requirement under GNP0-Trend is  about 
20%  of the  1989-1evel. The ZPG and HD scenarios require a rapid decline 
in capital stock requirement during the first two decades (1990-2010), which 
will be difficult to reach. In both target GNP2.3 and GNP0 the capital stock 
requirement is inversely related to the development in the number of labour 
years,  as  sketched in Fig.  5.  The lower the number of labour years,  the 
more capital will be needed to get an equal per capita GNP. 
In view of the historical  development, we cannot consider any of the 
economic targets under discussion as unrealistic, although under target GNP 
2.3 very high growth rates are required. To get an impression of the extent 
to which national income is taken up to meet the capital requirements we 
will look at the investment ratio. 8 
This  investment ratio  is  shown in Fig.  9.  From this  picture it will be 
clear that it is impossible to maintain a  rise in the GNP per capita at the 
level of the period  1965-1989  under all four demographic scenarios. The 
demand for capital investments exceeds the complete GNP. In the scenarios 
ZPG and HD, the investments required are within reach up to about 2050 
and for Trend to 2025. Up to that time private consumption can also grow, 
but afterwards too rauch of the GNP has to be used for capital investment, 
so that consumption per capita will then decline. 
The investment ratio derived from target CAP3  (an annual capital stock 
growth of 3%) seems to be within reach in all four demographic scenarios. 
The investment ratio -  and the required savings -  are such that consump- 
8 Because the projections are made using five-year intervals, the investment ratio in year t  (1Rt)  has 
been calculated as the quotient of the average annual change in the capital stock during the preceding 
five years (dKt)  and the GNP in the year t. So, IR~ =  dKJGNPt,  with dK  t =  ((KrtK~-5)  °'z -  1)*  K t. 190  JAN H.M. NELISSEN AND AD P.  VOSSEN 
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tion per capita increases. The investment ratio will grow steadily to about 
30% for HD, Trend and ZPG and to about 40% for IV. Under target CAP3, 
all demographic scenarios demand desinvestment, so that the investment ratio 
is generally negative. 
Some additional ratios are shown in Fig.  10 and Fig.  11. Figure 10 gives 
the productivity, as  measured by the real GNP per worker. Under target 
GNP2.3, Trend and ZPG follow the same growth path for productivity per 
worker  as  during  the  period  1965-1989.  The  course  of GNP2.3-IV  is 
somewhat above this path and the course of GNP2.3-HD develops somewhat 
beneath it until 2020, after which it has the same growth rate as during the 
latter period. Under the economic target CAP3,  productivity per worker 
also grows, but the growth rate is slightly below the level of the last 25 years. 
If zero-growth is preferred (target GNP0) the productivity per worker under 
HD  and  IV is  about constant from 2030  on.  Under Trend and ZPG  the 
productivity  in  the  future  hardly  differs  from  the  1989-1evel.  The  IV 
trajectory runs somewhat above this level, whereas HD is below. 
The productivity per worker is related to the capital stock requirement (see 
Fig. 8): if -  under a similar development in population totals, which is the 
case here -  a relatively high amount of capital is required to get a certain 
rate of growth for the per capita GNP (like in scenario IV), the produc- 
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In Fig. 11, the capital-labour ratio is presented. In 1989 this ratio amounted 
to about five times its  value of 1950.  However, the rate of increase has 
strongly diminished in the course of time. Under target GNP2.3, the capital- 
labour ratio has to grow with at least the same rapidity as during the period 
1950-1989. For GNP2.3-HD it holds that the growth has to be much stronger 
from 2015 on. The trend-growth-of-capital target (CAP3) demands a growth 
rate in the capital-labour ratio, corresponding with its development in recent 
history. The zero-growth target GNP0 shows a decline in the ratio for Trend 
and especially for HD. 
It will be clear that an economic growth -  in terms  of real per capita 
GNP -  at the average level of the last forty years, cannot be maintained if 
population  development  proceeds  along  the  lines  of  one  of  the  four 
demographic scenarios presented here. Under the scenarios Trend, ZPG and 
HD such a growth may be reached during a  number of decades, but after 
some time (about thirty years), in these cases too, a great part of the national 
income will have to be used for capital stock investments. Economic growth 
can only be maintained iflabour force participation rates keep increasing, 
which holds for HD and, to a less extent, for Trend and ZPG until the year 
2015.  From that year onwards, the required (riet)  investment ratio inclines 
and soon appears to be too high. Because IV presupposes a decreasing labour 
force participation rate from  1990  on, the investment ratio here increases 
immediately. 
Economic growth rates which correspond with a trend-growth-of-capital 
target (CAP3)  seem to be more realistic. Under Trend this implies a  GNP 
per capita growth rate of 1.92% a year, under ZPG 1.88%, under HD 1.78% 
and under IV only  1.19%. 
The zero-growth target requires desinvestment during about 20 years and 
it is debatable whether this will be attained. 
The foregoing does not imply that no other scenarios are thinkable, in 
which a limited economic growth is possible.  Our aim was just to give an 
indication of economic growth (im)possibilities  starting from two rather 
extreme demographic scenarios, rather than to produce real forecasts. Such 
an impossibility has been found in the combination of economic growth 
and a  society as  sketched under scenario IV.  This  scenario is  only within 
reach if society also opts for only very limited growth or chooses zero growth. 
This is quite in agreement with the a- and b-level of the scenario descrip- 
tion. 
Another important conclusion is  that it will not be possible,  under the 
scenarios  studied, to maintain economic growth which is  as  great as that DEMO-ECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE NETHERLANDS  193 
of the last forty years  in The Netherlands.  In view of the rather  strong 
differences in assumptions between these scenarios,  it will be clear that 
this will also hold for other 'realistic'  scenarios. Using the same method, 
but only the middle series population projections, Carlson (1990) arrives 
at the same conclusion for the United States. 
5.  Conclusions 
The core of this article can be summarized in the question: will population 
ageing become a threat to our standard of living? Roughly speaking, the 
research design chosen simply compares different degrees of population 
ageing  with  respect  to  their  long  term  effect on  welfare.  Because  the 
demographic and the economic system, which are linked together in our 
research question, share a number of significant determinants, it has -  for 
the sake of consistency -  been considered necessary to derive the future state 
of both systems from the same, highly aggregated mother scenarios. In this 
context two strongly contrasting mother scenarios have been developed. 
Subsequently, from both scenarios the demographic ageing process has been 
assessed. The scenario, based on the perspective of a highly individualized 
and material goals oriented society, was designated HD, while the scenario 
outlining the opposite perspective was marked IV.  The mother scenarios 
might be considered as  a couple of borderline scenarios, in the sense that 
they represent -  within the imagination of the authors -  the boundaries of 
plausibility. In addition to the ageing trajectories directly derived from these 
mother scenarios, two less explicitly elaborated demographic projections have 
been included in the analyses, to wit Trend (the official Dutch population 
forecast) and ZPG (a zero population growth variant). In terms of the ageing 
process both Trend and ZPG represent positions between HD and IV. 
The economic-demographic relationship is mediated through a  simple 
Cobb-Douglas production function. The ultimate question as  to whether 
the ageing process will jeopardize the standard of living, is answered for each 
of the demographic projections by  matching them with three economic 
targets, to wit (1) a GNP per capita growth comparable to that during the 
last 25 years  [called GNP2.3],  (2) a  zero-per-capita-growth [GNP0]  and 
(3) a capital stock growth comparable to that during the last ten years [CAP3]. 
It appears that the GNP2.3  target is not feasible for all scenarios in the 
long run. The IV scenario results in problems even in the short run, whereas 
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until about the year 2020.  The CAP3 target seems to be attainable under 
all four demographic scenarios. Even under scenario IV the required capital 
stock growth can be financed without a decrease in per capita consump- 
tion. 
The economic results presented are consistent with the assumed charac- 
teristics  of the  mother  scenarios.  The  highly progressive  and  strongly 
individualized HD  scenario, striving for high standards  of living, shows 
the largest growth potential. The resulting high labour participation rates 
require the relatively lowest investment ratio, productivity and capital-labour 
ratio,  so that an intended growth figure is relatively easy  to attain.  The 
orientation towards a more non-material society as assumed under the IV 
scenario, logically leads to a relatively low labour force participation. This 
requires extra capital investments to reach a certain GNP growth figure, 
and therefore problems in realizing the GNP2.3  target area logical conse- 
quence  of  the  underlying  assumptions.  In  demographic  and  labour 
participation terms Trend and ZPG held positions between HD and ZPG. The 
same position is taken in terms of the economic analysis. Attention should 
be paid to the fact that the economic outcomes of Trend and ZPG are rather 
similar. As at the 'demographic' level differences were not very substan- 
tial, this observation as such is not very surprising. It shows however, that 
the widespread popular opinion, to the effect that reaching a  stationary or 
ZPG population would be an adequate remedy against the negative effect 
of the current ageing process (as represented in Trend), can be seriously 
criticized. 
The most important conclusion is that in the long run, economic growth 
comparable with that of the 1960s  and  1970s is probably impossible. The 
HD  scenario  allows  a  postponement of the  (investment) problems  as  a 
consequence of the increasing labour participation rates, but also under HD 
we find a  decline in the LabYears/PopTot Ratio  (see Fig.  6) from 2020 
onwards. Also of importance is the fact that a capital stock growth of about 
3% a year is attainable under all scenarios. It requires larger investment ratios 
(and consequently higher savings ratios), but given the associated rate of 
economic growth this does not result in decreasing consumption patterns. 
Of course, our study contains several uncertainties. We have tried to look 
at the impact of two very diverging demographic scenarios, but alternative 
scenarios with respect of, for example, the migration surplus seem to become 
more and more plausible. For example, the consequence of higher immi- 
gration is that the GNP2.3  scenario is attainable for a longer time under a 
Trend-like scenario. However -  as a result -  it will only imply that problems DEMO-ECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE NETHERLANDS  195 
are temporarily delayed and not solved permanently. A  second point of uncer- 
tainty  is formed by  the  assumed constant technical progress  imbedded in 
the  Cobb-Douglas  production  function.  Here,  analogous  remarks can be 
made. Higher technical progress probably results in lower investment ratios 
and higher productivity. In that case Trend, ZPG and HD can reach higher 
growth figures, although this is very debatable -  and this is consistent with 
the underlying mother scenario -  whether this solves  the problems for the 
IV scenario.  A  third point of uncertainty can be found in the international 
economic context. How will international capital flows and interest rates react 
and how do these possible  changes  affect our results? Cutler et al.  (1990) 
show  a clear effect, but the magnitude appears to be too rnoderate in com- 
parison with the requirements for a large economic growth as under GNP2.3. 
When evaluating the meaning of the foregoing analyses, the reader should 
keep in mind the main purpose  of this  contribution,  which is  to  explore 
the  uncertainty  inherent in future  studies,  rather than to  supply  definite 
forecasts. 
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